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THE PROBLEM OF AGING AIRCRAFT: IS
MANDATORY RETIREMENT THE ANSWER?
ELIZABETH BRANNEN
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States air fleet currently faces an impending
crisis. American aircraft are getting older, and as the fleet
continues to age,' the problems resulting from aging air-
craft will become increasingly more urgent. Most airlines
continue to fly planes as they age,2 and many of these air-
craft have already exceeded their economic design goals 3
Experience proves that high-cycle planes,4 even those that
are well-constructed and kept in good repair, are vulnera-
ble to structural fatigue as they age.5 Additionally, corro-
sion problems often occur in older aircraft. Corrosion
I See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the aging
trend. The average age ofjetliners operated by the U.S. airlines [in 1989 was]just
under 13 years old, 21 percent higher than the average age in 1979. Aging Aircraft:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989) (statement of Mr. Ford, chairman of
the subcommittee) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
2 Katherine Rodeghier, Maintenance, not Age, Key to Plane Safety, CRAIN'S CHI.
Bus., June 25, 1990, at T5.
"The 'economic design goal' of an [aircraft] is typically considered to be the
period of service, after which a substantial increase in the maintenance costs is
expected to take place in order to assure continued operational safety." 54 Fed.
Reg. 22,300, 22,301 (1989) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 39) (proposed May 23,
1989).
4 A high-cycle aircraft is one that has gone through a high number of pressuri-
zation cycles. A complete cycle is composed of "one take-off, pressurization,
depressurization, and landing," since these activities place the most stress on an
aircraft. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Anthony Broderick, As-
sociate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA)).
Err on the Side of Safety, Av. WK. & Si'. TECH., March 6, 1989, at 9.
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and structural fatigue have been factors in at least 36 acci-
dents since 1983.6 As the air fleet ages, these age-related
incidents may become commonplace and result in the
tragedy of human lives unnecessarily lost.
Complicating the issue is the fact that demand for air
travel has increased dramatically since deregulation of the
airline industry, and production cannot keep up with the
increasing demand for new planes.7  Increased competi-
tion and the high cost of replacing older planes encourage
airlines to cut costs by continuing to use aging aircraft.8
Even with continued use of these older planes, manufac-
turers operating at full capacity cannot immediately meet
the needs of the growing industry.9 These factors force
airlines to provide an increased number of flights with an
aging fleet of planes, thus expanding the possibility of fu-
ture age-related accidents. Adequate maintenance proce-
dures for aging aircraft are crucial if airlines are to
continue to meet the public demand.
In April 1988, the crash of an Aloha Airlines Boeing
737 highlighted the problem of aging aircraft and trig-
gered an immediate response in the aviation commu-
nity.' 0 When the post-accident investigation revealed that
a structural failure in the "relatively old and heavily used
aircraft" " had caused the plane to crash, the implications
6 See Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Mr. Ford).
Rodeghier, supra note 2, at T5.
0 Id. Completely overhauling an airliner ranges in cost from $2,000,000 to
$20,000,000. An average new airliner costs $55,000,000. GAO says FAA Still Lacks
a Strategy for Airworthiness of Older Airliners, AIR SAFETY WK., Oct. 16, 1989, at 3, 4
[hereinafter GAO].
9 Boom or Bust, FLIGHT INT'L, July 4, 1990 (unpaged).
30 David Evans, Aloha Accident Grounded Long-held Safety Theories, CI. TRIB., Oct.
15, 1989, at C6. The NTSB called for a sweeping reevaluation of aging aircraft
issues, the FAA sponsored an industry-wide meeting on the subject, and both
houses of Congress have held hearings to assess the problems caused by aging
aircraft. Richard G. O'Lone, Safety of Aging Aircraft Undergoes Reassessment, Av. WK.
& SP. TECH., May 16, 1988, at 16, 18. The FAA has announced major overhauls
for more than 2000 older Boeing and McDonnell Douglas planes. Evans, supra, at
C6.
I' Assuring the Safety of the Aging Airline Fleet: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on A via-
tion of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. v
(1989) (summary of subject matter) [hereinafter Assuring the Safety].
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of the widespread use of older aircraft became evident to
the industry and the public alike.' 2
The Aloha accident received a considerable amount of
media attention. In the face of heightened public concern
regarding the safety of older aircraft, the industry began
to explore the numerous issues raised by the incident.
The government joined this effort as well. In fact, the
crash caused a "wholesale reassessment on the govern-
ment level of airline maintenance and the quality of in-
spection programs for aging aircraft."'" The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) sponsored an industry-
wide conference on aging aircraft,' 4 and as a result, two
industry task forces were formed to study the issue.'5 The
House of Representatives proposed a new strategy involv-
ing stricter inspection of older planes and better training
of FAA inspectors and engineers,' 6 while the FAA pro-
posed new airworthiness directives which broadened the
requirements for inspection and maintenance of aging
aircraft. 17
This comment addresses whether it is possible to reach
a level of maintenance and repair that will allow a prop-
erly cared for aircraft to fly virtually forever, or whether
there is a point at which an airliner should just be "taken
out to the boneyard and put out of its misery."' 8 It dis-
cusses the crash of the Aloha Airlines plane, which first
raised many of the aging aircraft questions, and addresses
the various problems associated with the issue of aging
aircraft. This comment evaluates the maintenance and in-
IS James Ott & Richard G. O'Lone, 737 Fuselage Separation Spurs Review of Safe-
guards, Av. WK. & Sp. TECH., May 9, 1988, at 92.
i Id.
14O'Lone, supra note 10, at 16.
Assuring the Safety, supra note 11, at ix.
H.R. 3774, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990). The bill, introduced by Represen-
tative James L. Oberstar (D-Minn.), Chairman of the House Public Works and
Transportation Committee's Subcommittee on Aviation, proposed to amend the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Id.
17 Ott & O'Lone, supra note 12, at 92.
is Robert L. Parrish, AgingAircraft Hysteria, Bus. & CoM. Av., Aug. 1989, at 70,
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spection schedules proposed by the FAA for those aircraft
that have served beyond their economic design goals.19 It
will examine the inspection procedures previously used
by the FAA, contrast them with the inspection policies re-
cently proposed and implemented by that agency, and
consider whether these new techniques are sufficient to
maintain an acceptable level of safety in the aging fleet.
This comment will then explore the alternative position
taken by the House of Representatives that retirement of
those planes is the better solution. Finally, after consider-
ing whether forced retirement constitutes a taking of
property under the Fifth Amendment, it will show that the
new maintenance procedures, if properly implemented
and enforced, are the best solution to the growing prob-
lem of aging aircraft.
II. THE ALOHA AIRLINES ACCIDENT
A. What Happened?
On April 28, 1988, a Boeing 737 operated by Aloha
Airlines experienced "an explosive decompression and
structural failure" when 18 feet of the plane's skin peeled
away from the aircraft during flight.20 ' The flight crew
performed an emergency descent, landing safely on Maui,
but not before the air, which escaped during decompres-
sion, sucked a stewardess out of the plane to her death2'
and seriously injured eight others.2 2 The damaged air-
craft was over 19 years old, and it had logged almost
90,000 flights. 23 The inspections, made by authorities
19 The economic design goal does not necessarily reflect the technical limita-
tions on the life of an aircraft; maintenance costs on these older planes, however,
are substantially higher. AGING AIRCRAFT SAFETY ACT OF 1990, REPORT TO Ac-
COMPANY H.R. 3774, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1989) [hereinafter House Report].
20 NTSB Safety Recommendation, A-89-53 to -69 (July 21, 1989) at 1 [hereinaf-
ter NTSB Report]. The plane, flying at 24,000 feet, was en route from Hilo to
Honolulu, Hawaii, when "skin and structure aft of the cabin entrance door and
above the passenger floorline separated from the airplane during flight." Id.
21 Walter Shapiro, The Plane Was Disintegrating, TIME, May 9, 1988, at 38.
22 Assuring the Safety, supra note 11, at v.
2-1 Evans, supra note 10, at C6. According to William Hendricks, director of ac-
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who investigated the cause of the crash, revealed exten-
sive fatigue, cracking and corrosion on two other high-cy-
cle planes. In response, the airline immediately took
these planes out of service.24
B. Causes of the Accident
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) de-
termined that the accident sequence began with the struc-
tural separation of the pressurized fuselage skin, which
caused the decompression within the plane. 5 Since a
search did not recover the portion of the fuselage in
which the structural failure originated, investigators ana-
lyzed the crash based on a detailed examination of the re-
maining structure and a study of the airworthiness history
of the aircraft.2 6 Multiple site damage (MSD)2" analysis
revealed numerous fatigue cracks in the lap joint along
stringer S-10L,2 8 the probable point of the failure, and in
other parts of the fuselage skin.29  According to the
NTSB,
It is probable that numerous small fatigue cracks in the lap
cident investigations for the FAA, "[t]hat equates to 13 flights a day every day for
19 years." Id.
24 O'Lone, supra note 10, at 16. According to one Aloha official, the airline
retired the aircraft not because they were unsafe, but because of the attention
focused on the issue of aging aircraft, which could make passengers uneasy. Id.
"An Aloha aircraft was involved .... We don't want our passengers to wonder
about the aircraft they are in." Id. See 54 Fed. Reg. 22,300 (1989) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 39) (proposed May 23, 1989).
25 NTSB Report, supra note 20, at 1. "Pressurizing an aircraft for high-altitude
flight and depressurizing it for a landing can be analogized to inflating and deflat-
ing a balloon. [E]ventually, the fuselage of the plane, like the surface of the bal-
loon, is apt to give way." Shapiro, supra note 21, at 38.
26 NTSB Report, supra note 20, at 1.
27 Multiple site damage occurs when "small cracks which start beneath fasteners
... suddenly link up to produce the type of failure we saw in the Aloha tragedy."
Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Anthony Broderick, Associate
Administrator for Regulation and Certification, FAA).
2 Stringers are longitudinal "stiffeners" that run the length of the fuselage.
They are spaced about 10 inches apart, and numbered from the top down.
O'Lone, supra note 10, at 18. Investigators found six cracks around rivets in the
lap joint by stringer 10 left, and similar cracks around rivets on other stringers.
Id.
2 ' NTSB Report, supra note 20, at 1, 2.
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joint along S-I OL joined to form a large crack (or cracks)
.... [A]t the time of the accident, numerous fatigue
cracks in the fuselage skin lap joint along S-10L linked up
quickly to cause catastrophic failure of a large section of
the fuselage.30
The NTSB urged Aloha to initiate maintenance, inspec-
tion, and overhaul procedures that contemplate the age
and rapid accumulation of flight cycles in its aircraft.3 ' In
analyzing the Aloha Airlines incident, the NTSB report
also took into account human error, noting that incorrect
repair techniques that appear harmless can lead to cata-
strophic results.3 For instance, there is evidence that a
required eddy current inspection3 3 was not conducted on
the plane involved in the Aloha air disaster.3 4 Other fac-
tors that contributed to the accident included Aloha's fail-
ure to supervise its maintenance crews adequately and the
FAA's failure to evaluate the maintenance program prop-
erly or require certain inspections recommended by the
so Id. at 2. "Cracks on the 737 fuselage skin usually travel 30-40 [inches] longi-
tudinally before stresses change to make the crack turn and run circumferentially,
limiting the size of the damage. However, if other cracks exist ahead of the pro-
pogating crack, they can delay turning of the crack, much like perforated paper."
Michael A. Dornheim, Boeing Methodology Faulted in Assessing Aircraft Corrosion, Av.
WK. & SP. TECH., July 18, 1988, at 91, 93.
3' NTSB Report, supra note 20, at 2.
32 Id. at 6. "The condition of high-cycle B-737s in the Aloha Airlines fleet with
respect to lap joint corrosion, multiple repairs, and detection of fatigue cracking is
an example of what can occur in the absence of regular and knowledgeable evalu-
ations of aircraft condition by qualified engineering staff." Id.; see also NTSB Says
Incorrect Repair Techniques Can Seem Harmless and Be Catastrophic, AIR SAFETY WK.,
Aug. 21, 1989, at 3.
.1 An eddy current or high speed air inspection is a high-frequency electronic
inspection designed to discover evidence of cracking and corrosion. Ott &
O'Lone, supra note 12, at 92.
14 NTSB Probes Aloha 737's Maintenance Records, Av. WK. & SP. TECH., Sept. 11,
1989, at 131. FAA regulations require that aircraft operators perform a "close
visual inspection" of the lap joints on all planes, and, if cracks are discovered, they
must also perform an eddy current inspection. Id. Aloha records reflect that the
visual inspection was completed, but does not indicate that the required eddy cur-
rent inspection was accomplished. Id. The cracks which caused the severe de-
compression of the plane in the Aloha accident "would have been present at the
time of other repairs in fall 1987, and would have been detectable by required
eddy current inspections." James Ott, NTSB Raps Aloha, Aviation System for Fuselage
Failure, Av. WK. & SP. TECH., May 29, 1989, at 24, 25.
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manufacturer.35
The Aloha Airlines accident brought the aging aircraft
issue before the entire industry. 6 Although Aloha flies
some of the hardest-working planes in the United States'
fleet,3 7 the tragedy brought to light a number of issues of
concern to the industry with respect to all aging aircraft.
The Aloha incident is not an isolated event; a number of
structural failures in older planes have forced the industry
to reevaluate its policies for maintaining aircraft as they
age to ensure their safety. 8
Several recent structural failures in older aircraft have
placed the issue of aging aircraft in the spotlight, and the
Aloha accident raised the issue to a new level of urgency.
The Aloha crash was tragic, but it had one positive effect:
the aircraft industry no longer believes that a plane main-
35 House Report, supra note 19, at 3. A required repair was never made in a
particular structural joint identified by Boeing. Id. As a matter of fact, two weeks
before the April crash, Boeing presented Aloha with an estimate that "predicted
the timing of a potential decompression with 'uncanny' accuracy .... The esti-
mate predicted the major failure at between 87,000 and 91,000 total cycles; the
Aloha accident occurred at 89,680 cycles." Dornheim, supra note 30, at 91. Com-
pliance with the Service Bulletins issued by manufacturers, which may involve
either special inspections or specific modifications to the aircraft, varies among
airlines. Compliance figures range from a low of 20% to a high of 80%. Senate
Hearing, supra note 1, at 74 (statement of Benjamin A. Cosgrove, Vice President,
Engineering Division, Boeing).
3 Evans, supra note 10, at C6. "The industry was really frightened by Aloha."
Erik Calonius, The FAA's Loose Grip on Air Safety, FORTUNE, Oct. 8, 1990, at 85, 96.
According to William Hendricks, Director of Accident Investigations for the FAA,
"[I]n retrospect it will be looked on as a landmark." Evans, supra note 10, at C6
(quoting William Hendricks). Therefore it will join "the list of air tragedies that
spurred the FAA to develop collision avoidance systems and advanced radars."
ld.
37 Peter Cary & Brian Duffy, When to Junk GeriatricJets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 16, 1988, at 16, 17. Because its inter-island flights in Hawaii average only 20
minutes each, Aloha planes go through significantly more pressurization and
depressurization cycles than other planes. Furthermore, because they fly
predominantly over salt water, corrosion is a greater hazard for Aloha planes. Id.
-' Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Sen. Hollings, Chairman). A
similar incident occurred in December, 1988, when the fuselage of a 28-year-old
Boeing 727 owned by Eastern Airlines tore open, leaving a 14-inch hole. Also in
December of 1988, a 19-year-old Boeing 747 owned by United Airlines broke
open during a flight over Hawaii, and a vintage 747 operated by Pan Am crashed
over Scotland. Incidents Spur Concern About Age of Planes, DALLAS TIMES HERALD,
Dec. 28, 1988, at A3.
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tained under the then-existing standards can be flown vir-
tually forever. Prior to the Aloha incident, the
government and at least one manufacturer, Boeing, had
expressed concerns about the aging process; 39 after the
accident, it became clear that new repair procedures to
prolong the lives of planes would be necessary if older air-
craft were to continue to fly safely. 40 Recognition of this
important fact was the first step in a new wave of improve-
ments in aircraft maintenance and safety.
III. THE AGING OF THE CURRENT FLEET
The American air fleet is aging rapidly. The average
age of the US air fleet in 1990 was 12.7 years, a figure
which is expected to increase. 4' Twenty percent of the
fleet is currently between 15 and 20 years old, and 31.5%
of the planes in the American fleet are over 20 years old
and past their projected life spans.4 2
No single criteria identifies aircraft as "old." The
"age" of a plane actually depends on many factors. Mea-
suring chronological age is one means of establishing the
"age" of an aircraft. Considering the number of flight cy-
cles a plane has accumulated is equally important in deter-
mining the wear on a plane because it is the pressurization
and depressurization that a plane experiences in flight
that places the most stress on the skin of the aircraft.43
Repeated pressurizations cause expansion and contrac-
tion over time of the metal that forms the plane's skin.
These cycles result in fatigue and cracking.44 Conse-
quently, to obtain a true picture of the "age" of an air-
craft, both the number of years and the number of cycles
39 Richard Witkin, FAA to Require Fuselage Repairs in Older 737Jets, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1988, Al, B5.
40 Evans, supra note 10, at C6.
4, House Report, supra note 19, at 4.
42 id. GAO statistics show that at present 31.5% of the US fleet is over 20 years
old, and the GAO predicts 64% will be in that category in 2000. Thirty-one per-
cent of the current fleet has exceeded its economic design life. GAO, supra note 8,
at 4.
43 House Report, supra note 19, at 3.
44 Id.
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that a plane has flown are relevant factors.45 As aircraft
age and cycles accumulate, cracks will inevitably occur and
expand.4 6 The need for inspection and maintenance in-
creases in importance as aircraft grow older.
The economic design life of a typical aircraft is 20 years
or 60,000 cycles. 47 This figure is based primarily on eco-
nomic considerations, which assume regular replacement
of certain critical parts.48 Because of economic trends in
the industry, the number of planes operating beyond their
design life will increase dramatically in the next ten years,
as will their proportion to the total fleet. While aircraft
over 20 years old comprised 28% of the world fleet in
1988, it is projected that over 40% of the fleet will fall
within this category by the year 2000.49 Unless airlines
begin to retire their older planes, this aging trend will
continue, resulting in operation of aircraft well beyond
their economic design life goals. 50 As the fleet ages,
safety concerns will become more and more pressing.
Anticipated growth trends in the air transport industry
further heightened concerns about the aging fleet.5' On
the heels of deregulation, airlines lowered fares in the
face of fierce competition for the increasing number of
45 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 41 (statement of Clyde R. Kizer, Vice Presi-
dent, Engineering and Maintenance, Air Transport Association of America). Ad-
ditionally, "the operating environment, specifically temperature and humidity"
must be considered as part of the plane's "age". Id. True "age" appears to be an
"intangible yardstick," even among planes with "similar high-cycle, high daily
utilization rates." Parrish, supra note 18, at 78.
4 House Report, supra note 19, at 3.
47 Id. at 4. Foreign research indicates, however, that "[t]he loads are generally
less than designed." Evans, supra note 10, at C6 (quoting Ben Dejonge, research
director in the Netherlands). In other words, actual stresses on old airplanes are
less than the manufacturers anticipated because of longer flights, which results in
fewer pressurization cycles, and lower flight altitudes, which reduces the cabin
pressure. Id. If the same proves true of the American fleet, it is "good news for
old planes." Id.
48 Cary & Duffy, supra note 37, at 16.
49 House Report, supra note 19, at 4.
50 Id. Marketplace considerations generally drive aircraft retirement decisions,
not design characteristics. Id. Airlines consider factors such as operating costs,
performance, fuel costs, technology, and noise constraints. Id. Excessive costs or
noncompetitive results may result in retirement for the plane. Id.
- Id. at 3.
4331991)
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passengers.52 Experts suggest that increased competition
necessitated cost-cutting policies, which were often mani-
fested by reduced maintenance programs.53 In fact, a
study by the Department of Transportation (DOT) shows
that airlines cut maintenance costs by 30% in the first six
years after deregulation. 4 Some pilots are concerned
that many airlines are now "maintaining their planes only
at the minimal levels required by the FAA," thus cutting
into the margin of safety.55 This concern is especially
valid with regard to older planes, which are more costly to
maintain than newer aircraft.
Various factors force airlines beyond their economic
design life goals. New aircraft production cannot keep
pace with industry growth and probably will not be able to
match the demand in the near future.56 This lag in pro-
duction has resulted, and will continue to result, in the
extended use of numerous aircraft beyond their intended
life spans.57 Due to backlogs in orders for new aircraft,58
delivery may be delayed for as many as five years after the
52 Paul Betts, Aerospace Industry: Prepared for a Rough Ride, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1990, at vi. "Passenger traffic is expected to grow from the current level of ap-
proximately 468 million passengers per year to 760 million in the year 2000."
House Report, supra note 19, at 3.
53 Calonius, supra note 36, at 85.
14 Id. at 96.
-1- Cary, supra note 37, at 18. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the measures taken by the FAA to increase the "minimal levels" of
safety it requires.
5, Rodeghier, supra note 2, at T5.
51 House Report, supra note 19, at 4.
58 See Rodeghier, supra note 2, at T5. In 1989, manufacturers booked orders for
1,809 jet airliners, but delivered only 562, according to one Airbus representative.
Boom or Bust, supra note 9. The following chart highlights the level of the backlog
and explains the slow delivery schedule:




McDonnell Douglas 86 14.1%
Fokker 54 30.2%
Rombac 50 100%
AIRCRAFT LEASING, Aug. 1990, at 12.
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order is placed. 59 Thus, to meet consumer demand, air-
lines continue to fly aircraft that they expected to retire.60
Furthermore, new planes are being used not to replace
old aircraft, but to supplement the existing fleets, thus ex-
panding the fleet to match passenger demand.6 1 Until re-
cently, low fuel prices also made it economical to continue
to use the older, less fuel-efficient planes rather than re-
tire them.6 2
The accuracy of industry growth projections is difficult
to evaluate. "It is very hard to disagree with most indus-
try observers that global industry traffic will grow in ex-
cess of an average rate of 6% per annum through the year
2000," stated Frederick Bradley, the industry analyst who
conducted the DOT study.63 While this recent analysis of
the future outlook for the industry indicates that the in-
dustry is "basically healthy," it still must deal with serious
and impending problems. 64 In addition to aging aircraft,
the airline industry must confront other important issues,
including congestion and noise regulations.65
In dealing with these important issues, the industry
must exercise caution. Eighty percent of the planes on or-
der for United States carriers are for just five airlines, and
the increased traffic they were ordered to handle has yet
to materialize.66 In 1989, domestic air traffic grew by a
mere 2%, and a growth of only 1% was predicted for
1990.67 Airline fares have already begun to climb due to
higher fuel prices. When increased fares are coupled with
the current recession, a short-term decrease in demand




, Boom or Bust, supra note 9. In fact, Bradley argued that 6% is probably a
conservative figure. Id.
' Id. Citibank Senior Vice President Frederick Bradley provided this analysis.
Id.
(;" Id. See infra notes 238-248 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
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for air travel is not surprising.6 8
While operating earnings for domestic airlines have
been forced down considerably, and with a further drop
predicted, airline debt is increasing due to investment in
new equipment and the costs associated with repairing ag-
ing planes or replacing them with newer, more fuel-effi-
cient aircraft.6 9 Labor costs are also rising steadily.70
According to Bradley, "The US industry should shake out
in the next few years ... reducing the survivors to five or
six relatively stable airlines."' t No longer will lower fuel
prices cushion weak airlines with older fleets, and the uni-
fication of the European Common Market in 1992 is ex-
pected to increase competition through an "open skies"
policy. 72
The effect of fuel cost fluctuations, increased competi-
tion, and limited demand growth on capital expenditure
decisions by the airline industry is uncertain. Airlines
must reconsider various aspects of their investment
spending plans, with two possible effects. On the one
hand, airlines may choose to curtail their expenses by
buying fewer new planes than anticipated, resulting in a
higher percentage of older planes left in use.73 On the
other hand, increased fuel prices may encourage airlines
to retire their older planes in favor of new fuel-efficient
aircraft.74
The industry seems to be heading toward continued use
of aging planes, so maintenance becomes a critical issue.75
Despite the rise in fuel prices, deregulation has prevented
significant fare increases; fares still fall below the regu-
lated levels of ten years ago.' 6 This factor leans toward
-8 Betts, supra note 52, at vi.
-8 Boom or Bust, supra note 9; Betts, supra note 52, at vi.
7,, Betts, supra note 52, at vi.
7, Boom or Bust, supra note 9.
72 Betts, supra note 52, at vi.
73 Id.
74 Id.
7-1 Arthur Reed, New Players in a New Game; Airline Maintenance Industry, AIR
TRANSPORT WORLD, Mar. 1990, at 83.
-' Betts, supra note 52, at vi.
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continued policies of repair, rather than retirement of ag-
ing aircraft. Assuming the continued presence of older
aircraft in the American fleet, the question becomes not
"whether to replace them, but how to anticipate structural
weaknesses, and to repair them before they become a
safety hazard." 77
Based on all of the factors discussed above, each airline
must decide either to repair or to replace older planes.
Because of the high volume of older planes in the fleet,
airlines will frequently face decisions on whether to sell or
maintain older planes. 71 Such decisions involve a compar-
ison of the cost and the time involved in acquiring new
aircraft with the cost of maintaining older aircraft. 79 The
average new airliner costs approximately $55,000,000.80
The overhaul of existing planes is substantially less ex-
pensive, even with new, more expensive FAA require-
ments.8 ' As long as it costs less to repair an older aircraft
than to buy a new one, and as long as the older airplanes
have sound airframes that will last several more years, air-
lines are most likely to invest in maintenance.8 2 The cur-
rent shortage of new planes makes this response even
more probable. 3 Given these circumstances, it appears
that aging aircraft will continue to be operated in large
numbers.84
The FAA has announced new methods of inspection
and maintenance to ensure the continued safety of the ag-
ing fleet.8 5 As airlines understand the full impact of the
opportunity costs of restricted fleet growth due to poor
maintenance techniques, perhaps they will begin to place
more of an emphasis on this crucial area.
77 Rodeghier, supra note 2, at T5.




"' Rodeghier, supra note 2, at T5.
". Id.
84 Id.
a. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 13 (Statement of Anthony Broderick, FAA
Administrator).
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IV. CHANGES AT THE FAA
The challenge of maintaining aircraft as they age is mul-
tifaceted; actual repair is one aspect, while predicting fa-
tigue and cracking and preventing corrosion are other
important factors.8 6 All three participants in the current
air transportation system - the manufacturers, the air-
lines, and the FAA - play important roles in assuring the
safety of US aircraft. 87 The duties of the FAA are essen-
tial, for they affect the actions of both of the other
branches of the system. The manufacturers design and
build aircraft, but their designs must be approved by the
FAA.88 It is the responsibility of the airlines to inspect
and maintain the aircraft in airworthy condition pursuant
to rules and regulations established by the FAA.8 9 The
FAA also approves maintenance plans and monitors air-
line maintenance performance. 90
A. Pre-Aloha Inspection Procedures
In the past, the FAA utilized a "damage tolerance" ap-
proach to aircraft maintenance, which concentrated on
identifying parts of aircraft that were likely to crack and
estimating when such cracks were likely to develop. 9 '
Based on these predictions, maintenance inspections were
scheduled early enough to detect any cracks.92 When a
crack was found, the FAA monitored its growth, but it
delayed repair until the crack reached a certain size. 93
Problems existed with this approach, including the tedi-
86 GAO, supra note 8, at 4.
87 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 70 (statement of Benjamin A. Cosgrove, Vice
President, Engineering Division, Boeing).
81 Id.
"' Id.
.0 Id. at 70-71.
91 Id. at 10 (statement of Anthony Broderick). This approach assumes that a
part will sustain damage and concentrates on designing parts to withstand such
damage until it is detected and corrected. Id. at 11.
1,2 Id. at 6. The FAA expected that should a section of an aircraft fail in spite of
these periodic checks, the "overall redundancy designed into today's aircraft
would preclude a massive failure of the type which led to the Aloha tragedy." Id.
!' House Report, supra note 19, at 4.
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ousness of the inspection process, which usually entailed a
visual inspection of hundreds of individual rivets and had
little built-in redundancy as an extra safety measure.94
The procedure failed to recognize fully the danger that
even small cracks in the fuselage skin present. The cabin
of an airplane flying at cruise altitude is pumped full of
air, which creates enormous pressures on the plane, as the
Aloha incident made clear.95 Cracks in vulnerable areas
of the fuselage can cause the highly pressurized air to rush
out with potentially devastating results.96
The Aloha crash revealed that existing FAA mainte-
nance procedures and regulations did not adequately as-
sure the airworthiness of the aging fleet. The NTSB
reported that "the current surveillance system can lead to
'rubber stamp' approvals and endorsement of an air car-
rier's operations and maintenance programs. '9 7 Accord-
ing to Anthony Broderick, FAA Associate Administrator
for Regulation and Certification, the Aloha tragedy
showed that the FAA maintenance philosophy required
adjustment.98
B. New FAA Policies
1. The First Step
The Aloha accident motivated the FAA to re-think its
approach and to implement a program that relies less on
the inspection process.9 9 FAA officials immediately began
a study of the problems, which resulted in a series of pro-
posed directives to combat the aging aircraft dilemma.'0 0
These directives, most of which have been implemented,
Id. at 3. In other words, the inspection process did not include adequate
procedures for double-checking the results to be sure of catching any damage that
was present.
9- Cary & Duffy, supra note 37, at 16. Air in the cabin may cause pressures of
"up to 10 tons on a plane's exit door." Id.
sw' Id.
97 NTSB Report, supra note 20, at 9.
98 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Anthony Broderick).
- House Report, supra note 19, at 3.
100 Evans, supra note 10, at C6.
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form a completely new approach to aircraft maintenance.
They entail extensive structural strengthening of older
aircraft.t'0
The new program utilizes a system of "supplemental in-
spection" based on an analysis that assumes the existence
of crack damage at each critical point on the plane, deter-
mines its rate of growth, and estimates the point in time at
which it will become unsafe. 10 2 The new approach man-
dates repair or modification at specified intervals, regard-
less of what inspections reveal.' 0 3 Additionally, the FAA
plans to exercise more "hands-on" involvement during
heavy maintenance checks and to develop new techniques
in the areas of structural testing and repair. 0 4 A program
of mandatory modification for planes that have exceeded
their economic design life is also intended to reduce the
possibility of structural failure.' 0 5 In effect, the FAA has
established life limits on aircraft component parts, rather
than on the aircraft as a whole.' 0 6 The life limits vary
among the structural elements, and the span assigned to
each part depends on a combination of several factors, in-
cluding the number of flight cycles, chronological age, or
actual hours of operation. 07
This new maintenance scheme represents a fundamen-
.... Witkin, supra note 39, at Al.
10 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Anthony Broderick). This
approach, the "Supplemental Structural Inspection Documents" program, was fi-
nalized in 1981. Id.
,o3 House Report, supra note 19, at 3. This maintenance plan "could conceiva-
bly result in an aircraft that contained none of its original structure." Henry
Lefer, Getting Old But Not Ready To Retire; Maintenance of Aging Airline Fleets, AIR
TRANSPORT WORLD, Nov. 1989, at 59.
,0- Assuring the Safety, supra note 11, at 12-13 (statement of Anthony Broderick).
o, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,300 (1989) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 39) (proposed
May 23, 1989). This program has been implemented through a series of Airwor-
thiness Directives (AD's) issued by the FAA. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 6
(statement of Anthony Broderick).
o Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 24-25 (statement of Anthony Broderick)
107 Id. at 25. Opponents of the new FAA scheme argue that the procedure does
not place enough emphasis on the number of completed flight cycles, making the
inspection and repair intervals too long to maintain high-cycle planes adequately.
Id. at 74 (statement of Benjamin A. Cosgrove, Vice President, Engineering Divi-
sion, Boeing).
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tal shift in perspective for the FAA. It is intended to pre-
vent planes from deteriorating until they reach the
dangerous condition of the Aloha plane by repairing de-
sign weaknesses rather than inspecting for damage.'0 8
For example, one proposed directive, issued on October
27, 1988, calls for the replacement of approximately 8000
trouble-prone rivets located on the fuselage of 100 or
more older 737s.'09 This directive addresses a specific
problem that the Aloha aircraft experienced. As the
panels of the fuselage of a 737 begin to pull apart due to
flight pressure, the rivets holding them in place experi-
ence an increased level of stress, and the knife-like edges
of the rivits cause cracks to form around them."t0 The
FAA directive calls for replacement of the flush rivets with
"buttonhead" rivets to avoid this problem."'
The FAA proposed a timetable for implementation of
this regulation, calling for modification of the most-used
planes first."12  For example, aircraft that have logged
more than 70,000 cycles must be repaired within 6
months, while those aircraft with less than 40,000 cycles
must be repaired within 36 months."' For aircraft with a
number of cycles in between these two ranges, the table
sets reasonable time limits for implementation.' 14
-o Witkin, supra note 39, at Al. Two other Aloha planes were taken out of
service after the crash when fatigue cracking and corrosion were discovered in
subsequent inspections. 54 Fed. Reg. 22,302. Furthermore, in September 1988,
workers on a Continental Boeing 737 found 30 cracks, similar to those on the
Aloha plane that crashed, some of which were more than a foot long. Anne Belli,
FAA Safety Directives Issuedfor Boeing 737s, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 28, 1988, at
Al.
- 53 Fed. Reg. 44,163 (1988) (proposed Nov. 1, 1988); see also Witkin, supra
note 39, at Al. Older rivets probably cause small cracks, which may grow as the
plane continues to experience stress from pressurization cycles. Belli, supra note
108, at A12. The FAA projects that these modifications will require 2016 man-
hours. At $40 per hour per mechanic, the FAA estimates a cost in excess of
$80,000 per plane. Airlines predict that, coupled with other repairs, and the lost
revenue from a reduced number of flights while planes are being repaired, the
cost will be much greater than the FAA's estimate. Witkin, supra note 39, at B5.
,,0 Witkin, supra note 39, at B5.
it Id.
112 Belli, supra note 108, at A12.
I"- Id.
1,4 53 Fed. Reg. 44,163 (1988) (proposed Nov. 1, 1988).
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In addition to repair directives like the one described
above, the FAA finalized directives of a slightly different
nature, again primarily as a result of the Aloha incident.
These directives imposed an altitude restriction on 737s
that have completed more than 40,000 flights.' "5 Since al-
titude is a factor that affects stress levels, these aircraft are
not allowed to fly above 26,000 feet until they have passed
a rigorous inspection." 6 The FAA system of preventative
maintenance is expected to be highly successful.
2. Continued Study
Since issuing its first directives in October 1988, which
affected only Boeing 737s, the FAA has continued to
study the problems associated with aging aircraft. Nu-
merous directives, affecting all Boeing as well as most Mc-
Donnell Douglas aircraft, now impose much stricter
inspection and maintenance procedures on the airlines
than those the industry had become accustomed to in the
past. As the FAA continues to study the issue, it will issue
even more directives in an attempt to make the aging fleet
a safe fleet.
Early in 1989, the FAA proposed a $35 million program
involving the modification of approximately 623 Boeing
727s' 17 and finalized a rule requiring increased inspection
of McDonnell Douglas DC-9s. '" 8 The Boeing 727 propo-
sal urges both visual and eddy current inspections of
planes built using a cold-bonding method." 9 Replace-
", Belli, supra note 108, at A12. These altitude restrictions were designed to
reduce the stress that aircraft experience in flight as a result of maintaining nor-
mal air pressure inside the plane. Id.
' Id. The airlines would be required to conduct the necessary inspections. Id.
FAA Proposes Checks For Cracks on 727s, Av. WK. & Sp. TEcH.,Jan. 16, 1989, at
63 [hereinafter FAA Proposes Checks]; see 54 Fed. Reg. 1383 (1989) (proposed Jan.
13, 1989).
11 See 53 Fed. Reg. 46,447 (1988)(proposed Nov. 17, 1988). Unlike their Boe-
ing counterparts, the McDonnell Douglas aircraft will not have to undergo com-
plete reworking; certain lap joints in the McDonnell Douglas planes will not
require replacement. Christopher P. Fotos, Task Force Outlines Fixes for Aging Doug-
las Fleet, Av. WK. & Sp. TECH., Sept. 18, 1989, at 122. Beyond this exception,
however, the directives aimed at the two manufacturers are almost identical. Id.
-, FAA Proposes Checks, supra note 117, at 63. In 1971, Boeing recognized an
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ment of rivets, as in the 737s, was also proposed for the
727s, although fewer rivets are subject to such replace-
ment. 120  Additionally, the FAA adopted a rule which
mandates eddy current inspections of DC-9s in areas over
the wings and requires repair of any cracks these inspec-
tions reveal. 12' This directive affects 476 DC-9s. 122
On March 6, 1990, the FAA announced its furthest
imperfection in the design of its original planes and, after the 291st plane was
built, implemented a structural alteration to change the assembly of the 50 or so
panels that comprise the fuselage skin. Witkin, supra note 39, at B5. Older jets
were built using a cold-bonding process. In other words, the adhesive bond was
made at room temperature. Id. As a plane spent more time in flight, the bonding
tended to deteriorate and pull apart. Id. Coupled with "flush" rivets, the cold-
bonding may allow the layers to shift and cause cracks, which typically begin at the
"fastener countersink hole." 54 Fed. Reg. 1383 (1989); FAA Proposes Checks, supra
note 117, at 63. Furthermore, cold-bonding fosters the retention of water drop-
lets, a potential source of corrosion. O'Lone, supra note 10, at 17. Boeing's
change to a hot-bonding technique, which drives out any water absorbed in the
bonding process and provides a more uniform distribution of adhesive, appar-
ently solved this problem. Belli, supra note 108, at Al. O'Lone, supra note 10, at
18. No significant cracking has been reported in planes produced using this tech-
nique. Witkin, supra note 39, at B5.
According to Representive Glickman, former Chairman of the House Subcom-
mittee on Science, Space, and Technology, these structural modifications should
extend to "all aircraft which are approaching or have exceeded the use they were
designed to handle." O'Lone, supra note 10, at 18. While design differences,
such as thickness of the outer skin, make the 727 less vulnerable to cold-bonding
failures than the 737, the same inspection procedures and maintenance tech-
niques are necessary to ensure their safety. 54 Fed. Reg. 1383 (1989).
McDonnell Douglas never used the cold-bonding method, choosing instead a
mechanical-fastener process. O'Lone, supra note 10, at 18. Nevertheless, the FAA
now requires inspection procedures on McDonnell Douglas aircraft similar to
those imposed on Boeing jets. Fotos, supra note 118, at 122.
-0 FAA Proposes Checks, supra note 117, at 63. Approximately 4150 rivets on
each aircraft will be replaced; with inspections, 1432 man hours per aircraft are
projected. The FAA estimates that the cost of implementing this directive will be
$56,000 per aircraft. Six hundred twenty-three cold-bonded 727s will be affected,
so the total cost of implementing the directive will be nearly $35 million. Id.
.21 Id. This directive differs from prior procedures in that inspections occur at
more regular intervals and immediate repairs must be made on all cracks, without
an evaluation of when the cracks will become dangerous. See supra notes 91-98
and accompanying text for a discussion of prior inspection procedures.
22 FAA Proposes Checks, supra note 117, at 63. As proposed, this rule applied
only to DC-9s that had logged 55,000 pressurization cycles. When cracks were
discovered in 20 aircraft with fewer cycles, the FAA reduced the inspection thresh-
hold to 45,000 landings. After the initial inspection, each aircraft must undergo
inspection every 5800 landings. Id.
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reaching proposal for aging aircraft.123 Effective April 17,
1990, older Boeing jets became subject to regulations that
require repair or replacement of certain parts. 24 Periodic
replacement of parts is now mandatory, a significant change
from the old system which required replacement only af-
ter inspection proved it necessary.12- Designed to prevent
fatigue cracking, this program could cost up to $142 mil-
lion. ' 26 The airlines have four years to complete the re-
quired changes. 127 The FAA also hopes that these
regulations will make mandatory retirement of aircraft
unnecessary.12
On the same day, the FAA also proposed a limitation on
the amount of corrosion permitted on older planes.'
29
The task forces on aging aircraft reported that corrosion
may be a greater problem than anticipated. 30  Compre-
hensive maintenance and inspection programs to fight
corrosion in Boeing aircraft took effect on December 31,
1990, requiring airlines to monitor approximately 100
components of each plane for flaking, rusting, or contami-
nated metal. 13  The FAA proposed similar directives for
McDonnell Douglas planes. 132 While most airlines regu-
larly monitor for corrosion as part of their normal mainte-
nance procedures, some are more diligent than others. 33
,23 FAA Proposes Rules For Older Boeing 727s, 737s, 747s, Av. LrriG. REP., Mar. 13,
1990, at 11,476 [hereinafter FAA Proposes Rules]; see 55 Fed. Reg. 8374 (1990).
,24 FAA Proposes Rules, supra note 123, at 11,476.
,25 Don Phillips, FAA Proposes First Rules on Jet Corrosion Prevention, WASH. POST,
March 7, 1990, at A2.
12( FAA Proposes Rules, supra note 123, at 11,476. The rule calls for 165
mandatory repairs and replacements of parts. The directive focuses primarily on
fuselages, but work is also required on wings, doors, tails, landing gear, and en-
gines. Planes will be scrutinized more closely depending on their age and the
number of cycles they have logged. Id.
,27 Id. The FAA estimates that many of the repairs mandated in the new direc-
tive have already been performed by the airlines. If this is the case, the cost may
be far less than the original estimate. Phillips, supra note 125, at A2.
,28 FAA Proposes Rules, supra note 123, at 11,476.
129 Id. "The most serious corrosion problems are in fuselage sections under-
neath aircraft kitchens and lavatories." Id.
1-.0 Phillips, supra note 125, at A2.
13' See 55 Fed. Reg. 49,258, 49,263, 49,268 (1990).
-2 Id. at 49,634 (1990) (proposed Nov. 30, 1990).
'." Phillips, supra note 125, at A2.
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The new directives require periodic inspection and insti-
tution of corrosion-prevention programs.1
3 4
While no accidents have been caused by structural fa-
tigue in McDonnell Douglas aircraft, in September 1989,
the FAA announced a preventive program designed to en-
sure the continued safety of those planes.'3 5 This plan re-
quires modification, inspection, and replacement of
suspect parts.' 3 6 The industry task force, which is system-
atically evaluating aging aircraft issues such as mainte-
nance, repair and inspection for all major commercial
transports, found many of the same problems in both Mc-
Donnell Douglas and Boeingjets. 3 " Hence the directives
for the DC-8, DC-9, and DC-10 are similar to those
promulgated for Boeing planes.13 8  The cost of the re-
quired repair that must be done on McDonnell Douglas
aircraft will probably total only approximately half of the
cost of keeping Boeing planes airworthy. ' 39 The directive
will have a greater immediate impact on McDonnell
Douglas than Boeing, however, because "fewer Boeing
aircraft are near their respective threshholds. '
' 40
The cost of implementing the new FAA regulations to
assure the continued operation of older aircraft is of great
concern to the aviation industry.' 4 ' The number of jets
initially affected by the FAA requirements is relatively
I" Id.
1"- FAA Announces Anti-Fatigue Program For Older McDonnell Douglas Airliners, AIR
SAFETY WK., Sept. 18, 1989, at 3. "Typical fixes include replacement or repair of
flap tracks, bolts, cracked door areas and joints." Fotos, supra note 118, at 122.
16 Fotos, supra note 118, at 122.
't3 Id.
13s Id. "Unlike 727s and 737s, certain lap joints on the Douglas aircraft will not
need to be replaced." Id. Furthermore, according to Patrick S. Murphy, vice presi-
dent of operations of Avitas, a technical services and appraisal company, Boeing
aircraft "tend to have more corrosion problems," while McDonnell Douglas trans-
ports experience more trouble as a result of stress cracks. Id. at 123.
, - Id. at 122. This difference is largely attributable to Boeing's initial use of the
cold-bonding process, which McDonnell Douglas did not employ. Id. Cost esti-
mates vary according to aircraft type as well as how well each aircraft has been
maintained by its operator. Id. at 122-23.
- Id. at 123.
14 FAA Proposes Checks, supra note 117, at 63.
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small, 42 but as the fleet continues to age the FAA direc-
tives will affect more planes and will increase the cost to
the industry. 43 In spite of this fact, Boeing and the avia-
tion industry as a whole reportedly support the FAA ac-
tions. 144 For instance, Dale Warren, a vice president of
the Douglas Aircraft Company, called the FAA's aging air-
craft recommendations "one of the best things that has
happened in the aviation industry in the last 30 years." 41
Next to the value of the planes, the repair costs are rea-
sonable, especially in light of the current demand for air-
craft.' 46 In fact, other expenses involved in operating an
airline dwarf the costs imposed by these directives. 47
C. New Procedures in an Old Environment
1. Problems at the FAA
Despite the enormous cost that the various new inspec-
tion and maintenance techniques will impose on the in-
dustry, the FAA anticipates favorable results.'48 The
effectiveness of these new procedures, however, depends
on the resolution of problems within the FAA. The
Agency does more than establish the basic regulatory re-
142 FAA Orders New Measures to Combat Corrosion in Older Boeing Airliners, AIR
SAFETY WK., Mar. 12, 1990, at 3. The regulations adopted in March, 1990, for
example, initially affected only 115 Boeing jets. Id. The new directive applies to
all planes over 20 years old, 727s with 60,000 accumulated flights, 737s with
75,000 flights, and 747s with 20,000 flights. Id. The immediate effect on McDon-
nell Douglas transports will be greater, as virtually all DC-8s and a majority of DC-
9s will require repairs as a result of the promulgation of the directive. Fotos, supra
note 118, at 123.
14-1 FAA Proposes Checks, supra note 117, at 63. Approximately 1300 jets will even-
tually be affected. Id.
144 Phillips, supra note 125, at A2.
'4- John H. Cushman, Industry Unit and U.S. Back Changes in Jet Maintenance, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at A16.
,M, Fotos, supra note 118, at 123. The repairs should also enhance the aircraft's
market value. Id.
147 Cushman, supra note 145, at A16.
148 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Anthony Broderick, Associ-
ate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, FAA). "This is a high priority
issue with us. We are directing our efforts toward immediate corrective action for
problems as they manifest themselves in our aging fleet. We are taking long
range action towards the improvement of an airplane's tolerance to fatigue dam-
age and corrosion .... Id,
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quirements; it also serves an important surveillance func-
tion that insures compliance by the operators and
manufacturers.' 49  The effectiveness of the regulations
and directives depends upon enforcement, but the agency
responsible for enforcing them is underfunded, un-
dermanned, and poorly managed. 150
Since deregulation, the problems of the FAA have be-
come severe; more planes are flying, and a greater per-
centage of them are older. 15  Under competitive
pressures, many airlines are choosing to forego the extra
margins of safety they once routinely maintained. 52
Hence, at a time when the FAA is less able to shoulder
responsibility for airfleet safety, the agency must play a
more crucial role in monitoring maintenance than it has in
previous years.
While the FAA identifies the human element 53 as one
major factor in the problem of maintaining older air-
craft, 54 the agency must address other serious issues as
well. One problem is that engineers and inspectors often
do not receive the training they need. 55  In fact, FAA
training programs for inspectors and engineers have been
called both outdated and inadequate. 56  In 1989, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) interviewed seventeen
149 Id. at 42 (statement of Anthony Broderick).
1-5o Calonius, supra note 36, at 85. Three separate federal investigative agencies
have confirmed the widespread problems within the FAA. Id. at 96. It is "beyond
dispute" that the FAA needs to patrol the airlines more effectively. Id. at 88.
- See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of
deregulation on age trends in the fleet.
'' Calonius, supra note 36, at 85.
153 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 16-17 (statement of Anthony Broderick).
The FAA has taken long range action towards improving "inspection reliability
including reducing reliance on inspections as a means of limiting the possibility of
human error." Id. at 18.
154 Id. at 25.
'5 Calonius, supra note 36, at 92. "Many of the FAA's training courses are ap-
pallingly obsolete." Id. For instance, the NTSB reported that at the FAA Acad-
emy in Oklahoma City, trainees were required to study topics such as wood
airframes. Id. The FAA still has no courses in composite materials used in the
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electronics inspectors and determined that none of them
had received even the limited amount of training that they
were scheduled to receive.' 57 Nevertheless, these agents
performed inspections and worked on aircraft on a regu-
lar basis.' 58
The FAA may have sent these inspectors into the field
early to mitigate a second problem - shortage of man-
power. The agency admits that it has been experiencing a
shortage of inspectors for several years.' 5 9 The practice
of sending inexperienced inspectors into the field, how-
ever, results in inadequate inspections, which cannot be
tolerated because of the potential for tragic errors. For
example, in its report on the Aloha incident, the NTSB
stated that if the FAA inspector assigned to the Aloha
planes had been properly trained, the accident of April
1988 might never have occurred. 60 In fact, the Aloha in-
spector had no training in corrosion control, spotting
problems with certain joints in 737s, or the general main-
tenance of older planes.' 6'
The FAA's method of inspection presents a third major
problem. FAA inspectors spend most of their time audit-
ing the record books kept by airline mechanics. 62 These
audits reveal procedural errors (assuming the records are
accurately kept) but rarely reflect the actual condition of
the aircraft.' 63 Manufacturers believe that the agents
should actually inspect the airplanes, as well as review the
157 Id.
158 Id.
-s" Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 26-27 (testimony of Anthony Broderick).
-o NTSB Report, supra note 20, at 8.
16, Calonius, supra note 36, at 92.
162 Id.
163 Id. In December 1987, the FAA conducted a "special inspection" of Aloha.
Most of the examination, however, was of paperwork, and "a ramp inspection of
eight aircraft turned up trivial items on three of them, but no finding of corro-
sion." Dornheim, supra note 30, at 91. If FAA inspectors had actually inspected
the Aloha planes perhaps they would have noticed what the NTSB post-accident
investigators reported - swelling and bulging skin, pulled and popped rivets, and
blistering and flaking paint at many sites along lap joints on most of the planes.
Calonius, supra note 36, at 92.
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paperwork.' 64
As the FAA expands its role to include more compre-
hensive surveillance, other problems will inevitably arise.
Corrosion detection, for instance, represents a particu-
larly problematic area of inspection. It involves a tedious
and mind-numbing process that requires a well-trained
person of high intelligence and concentration. 16  The
FAA must improve procedures designed to combat
human error if inspections are to be more effective.
The FAA's primary problem is its worker shortage.
While the inspection staff has grown by almost 75% since
1985, the workload has grown even faster.' 66  Staff
shortages continue partly because of training backlogs. 6 7
One result of these shortages is that inspectors are sent
out before they are fully trained;'6 another is that inspec-
tors are overworked, substantially limiting their effective-
ness. 169 Regional imbalances of inspectors with particular
specialties, which may worsen with the new inspection re-
quirements, compound the problem of worker
shortage.17 0  Because of shortages, the overworked in-
spectors often do not follow up on critical matters.' 7' In
the case of the Aloha incident, for example, the NTSB ac-
cused the FAA of sending Aloha an incomplete directive;
the agency singled out two of twelve parts that Boeing re-
- Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Benjamin A. Cosgrove,
Vice President, Engineering Division, Boeing).
,65 Calonius, supra note 36, at 96. "They have a little hand-held device that the
guy runs across every rivet on the airplane," says the GAO's director of transpor-
tation issues. Id.
16 Id. at 92.
1r7 FAA Training Plan Faces Schedule Slippages, GAO Says, Av. DAILY, Mar. 15, 1990,
at 513 [hereinafter Training Plan].
68 See supra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
369 The Aloha inspector, for instance, was also assigned as the Principal Main-
tenance Inspector for nine other operators and seven repair stations in the Pacific
Rim area. Calonius, supra note 36, at 92. "His territory stretched from Hong
Kong to Hawaii." Id. The NTSB reported that this inspector was too overworked
to be effective. See NTSB Report, supra note 20, at 8.
170 Training Plan, supra note 167, at 513.
171 Calonius, supra note 36, at 92. GAO investigators found that in 8 out of 10
instances, FAA employees did not verify compliance with airworthiness directives.
Id.
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ported were in need of inspection, ignoring the other
ten. 1
72
The FAA is busily working in several areas to deal with
the problems they face. In 1989, between 200 and 300
new inspectors joined the FAA.' 7 3 Over a period of three
years, the Agency expects a total increase in staff of
30%. 74 In spite of these projections, the Agency antici-
pates having approximately 250 inspectors short of those
needed. 75 Efforts on all fronts will hopefully enable the
FAA to monitor and enforce maintenance standards more
effectively, 76 but funding for the necessary measures con-
tinues to be a problem. 177
The FAA's attempts to improve the quality of its work
and to recruit more inspectors are impeded by the bu-
reaucracy involved, which makes change difficult.' 78 The
'12 NTSB Report, supra note 20, at 7. "[T]he limited AD requirements imposed
by the FAA precluded the continuing airworthiness of the aging B-737s and the
reduced inspection criteria is considered a contributing factor to the cause of this
accident." Id.
17 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 26 (Statement of Anthony Broderick).
174 Id.
17.1 Training Plan, supra note 167, at 513.
17,1 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 24 (statement of Anthony Broderick). Mr.
Broderick states:
[W]e are recruiting and hiring additional inspectors. We are in-
creasing the numbers and types of surveillance our inspectors are
required to perform. We are training our inspector work force on
what to look for during their on-site visits, especially in the area of
structural inspection techniques. We are sending teams of exper-
ienced inspectors and FAA structural engineers into the field to visit
airlines and study the positive and negative impacts on the structural
inspection process, including the areas of corrosion control,
nondestructive testing techniques, airworthiness directive compli-
ance, and human factor issues. We hope to fashion improved policy
from these studies which will ensure the safety of our aging fleet.
ld.
77 In a confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, Samuel K. Skinner stated, "I know the importance of
spending money at the FAA across the board," but would not commit to an in-
creased spending level. Michael Mecham, Senators Press Skinner on Civil Aviation
Agenda, Av. WK. & Sp. TECH., Jan. 30, 1989, at 70.
17, Calonius, supra note 36, at 94. Past administrators are "unsparingly critical"
of the red tape. Id. According to one administrator "[t]o try to advance a pro-
gressive agency with all that bureaucratic baggage is really difficult. You have a
lot of bosses." Id. A pending Senate bill which "calls for an FAA separate from
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involvement of Congress, the hierarchical structure of the
agency, and the financial constraints pose hurdles to the
objectives of training and maintaining an adequate in-
spection staff.179 Meanwhile, airlines in the United States
are becoming bigger and more complex. As planes age,
air travel becomes more dangerous.1 8 0
2. Other Obstacles
The FAA's troubles are not the only obstacle to effec-
tive implementation of the new directives. Manufacturers,
operators, and the FAA operate together to ensure air-
fleet safety. Their relationship can be compared to a
three-legged stool, since each body must operate properly
for the system to work. 8 Thus, like the FAA, airlines and
manufacturers must address the problems that impede
their effectiveness.
One problem facing airlines is the wide variation of in-
spection and maintenance programs among operators.18 2
To avoid deferral of maintenance beyond the proper
time, Benjamin Cosgrove of the Boeing Company sug-
gests the development and enforcement of a minimum in-
dustry standard.18 3 Another hurdle the airlines face is the
need for proper technical capability, which enables them
to use technical information distributed by manufacturers
properly.'8 4  Such capability might be ensured by sus-
the DOT" reflects an effort to avoid at least some of the red tape, but some won-
der whether this measure would significantly decrease the bureaucracy within the
FAA. Id. at 100.
,19 Id. The FAA must deal with Administration political appointees and med-
dling Congressmen, in addition to entrenched civil servants who know they will
outlast the appointed administrators. The hierarchical management structure dis-
courages initiative at lower levels. Finally, financing within budget constraints is
an ever-present problem. Id. For instance, once an inspector is well-trained, the
salary that the FAA can offer him is significantly less than what the market will pay
for his skills. Id. at 92. Attrition rates at the FAA are a significant part of the
manpower problem since inspectors often move to industry jobs. Id.
- Id. at 94.
'"' Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of Anthony Broderick).
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taining adequate engineering and maintenance depart-
ments. Finally, since only the airline knows the different
stresses that a particular aircraft has experienced, it is best
equipped to deal with the aging process.18 5 A well-
equipped and trained maintenance staff is fundamental to
meeting these needs.
Like airlines, manufacturers need to improve their role
in the system of assuring the safety of the aging airfleet.
Initially, communications with airlines and regulatory
agencies must be improved. 86 Manufacturers need to
gain a better understanding of the effectiveness of the
maintenance programs they recommend. 87 This knowl-
edge may help improve the overall condition of the fleet
as manufacturers issue more appropriate
recommendations.
V. GOVERNMENT ACTION
A. The House Bill
Although all three branches of the air transport indus-
try are attempting to eliminate the problems discussed
above, these problems overshadow the significant actions
by the FAA in the eyes of some critics. In spite of its con-
tinuing efforts in the aging aircraft arena, the FAA is "still
accused of not doing enough."'' 8 8 As a result, Congress
has involved itself in the aging aircraft issue to an extent
beyond that of mere supervision of the FAA. In fact, 1990
was expected to be a watershed year for shaping the fu-
ture of the aviation industry, and some potentially impor-
tant legislation was introduced that year. 8 9 While 1989
did not produce landmark legislation in the aviation area,
the issues received a good bit of attention in both houses
I" Id. at 79.
,, Id. at 81. "Clarity of the service bulletins, timeliness and emphasis of infor-
mation provided regarding fleet problems should be improved." Id.
187 Id. at 80.
1' Cary & Duffy, supra note 37, at 18.
189 Legislation Sparse in 1989, but Aviation Receives Attention, Av. DAILY, Dec. 1,
1989, at 402.
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of Congress.' 90 Specifically, both the Senate and the
House of Representatives held hearings on the issues
raised by the aging aircraft problem to determine what, if
any, action was necessary.' 9 1
Late in 1989, after the initial Airworthiness Directives
(ADs) were finalized by the FAA, Representative James
Oberstar,' 92 Chairman of the House Public Works and
Transportation Committee's Subcommittee on Aviation,
stated that while current law gives the FAA broad latitude
in this area, including the authority to deal with the aging
aircraft problem on its own, he was prepared to legislate
a solution if the FAA did not act promptly and
satisfactorily. 193
To assure the flying public that the air transport system
in the United States is operating at the highest level of
safety, Oberstar advocates an approach that evaluates
each aging aircraft as a whole, "not a collection of re-
placeable parts."' 94 Furthermore, since the new mainte-
nance programs focus primarily on flight hours or
calendar time, rather than flight cycles, Oberstar argues
that the inspection intervals for high-cycle planes are too
long to assure adequate safety of these aircraft.' 95 Finally,
-0 Id.; see also Mecham, supra note 177, at 70.
19' See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 1; Assuring the Safety, supra note 11, at
V.
192 Democrat Minnesota.
193 Age Limits for Transports? Rep. Oberstar Says Airlines Should Justify Use of Older
Airplanes, AIR SAFETY WK., Oct. 10, 1989, at 1, 3.
- Id. at 3. Despite Oberstar's comments, the FAA feels that a life limit set on
crucial parts of the aircraft's structure is sufficient to ensure safety; the agency
presently has no plans to establish a mandatory retirement age for any aircraft. Id.
at 3-4. In fact, many experts fear that setting a mandatory retirement age would
be nothing more than a knee-jerk reaction to a complex problem. Hearing on Aging
Aircraft Questions FAA Maintenance Standards, REGIONAL Av. WKLY., Apr. 14, 1989.
"[S]ince aircraft age by use, corrosion, and hard landings, among other factors",
more than chronological age should be considered before retiring any plane. let
Acting chairman of the NTSB, James Kolstad, supports the FAA proposals that
require mandatory retirement of aircraft parts, not aircraft. Business Aviation Briefs:
James Kolstad, WKLY. OF Bus. Av., Feb. 5, 1990, at 46.
"95 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 74 (statement of Benjamin Cosgrove, Boe-
ing). The FAA, however, has indicated that it does consider the number of flight
cycles in its determination of maintenance schedules. Id. at 11, 12 (statement of
Anthony Broderick).
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the FAA's decision to give airlines four years to imple-
ment its new program is a cause of concern. 196 Legisla-
tors fear that the delay factor will encourage some airlines
to procrastinate, eventually compromising fleet safety.' 97
In response to these concerns, in November 1989,
Oberstar and Representative William F. Clinger, Jr. 9 8 co-
sponsored House Resolution 3774 (H.R. 3774). The bill
is designed to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
relating to the suspension of airworthiness certificates at
the end of the economic design life of aircraft.' 99 Essen-
tially, the bill adopts the Navy's "safe-life" concept.2 0 0 It
requires that the FAA establish a way to accurately deter-
mine the design life20' of aircraft and mandate special in-
spections of aircraft during the last year of the expected
design life.20 2  These inspections would determine
whether or not the plane could remain in use in air com-
merce. 20 3 The individual airlines would have the burden
of proving to the FAA that the maintenance of all "age-
sensitive parts and components" of the aircraft has been
adequate and timely enough to assure a continued high
level of safety beyond the plane's design life.2 0 4 The bot-
tom-line result of H.R. 3774 would be a suspension of the
- Allen Li, Shortage of Facilities May Cause Crisis, AIRCRAFT LEASING, Aug. 1990,
at 28.
197 Id.
'11 Republican Pennsylvania. Representative Clinger is the Subcommittee on
Aviation's ranking minority member. See House Bill Would Require the FAA to Set Age
Limits for Airliners, AIR SAFETY WK., Dec. 11, 1989, at 3 [hereinafter Age Limits].
- H.R. 3774, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
21,,1 Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Senator Ford, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Aviation). The "safe-life" concept means that "aircraft
structures and parts are not operated beyond a limit established by extensive test-
ing. Planes are not repaired beyond a certain point; they are just retired." Id.
20, The design life is not to be confused with the economic design life of an air-
craft. The economic design life refers to the point in time when maintenance
costs are expected to skyrocket; design life refers to the number of years that a
properly maintained plane can safely fly. See H.R. 3774, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3
(1990).
202 Id. See also House Bill Would Require the FAA to Set Age Limits for Airliners, supra
note 198, at 3.
203 H.R. 3774, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990); see also supra note 198, at 3.
204 H.R. 3774, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990). The bill does not define "age
sensitive parts and components." Id.
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airworthiness certificate on the last day of a plane's design
life until the FAA determines after inspection that the
plane can safely continue to provide air transportation. °5
This requirement may mean that an airplane could be out
of service for as long as two weeks while it undergoes a
thorough inspection. 0 6
The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3774 by a
voice vote on July 16, 1990.207 They requested Senate
concurrence and transferred the bill to the Senate Com-
205 Age Limits, supra note 198, at 4.
26 Li, supra note 196, at 28.
-07 136 CONG. REC. H4741 (daily ed. July 16, 1990); see House Passes Bill Ordering
FAA to WriteAircraft Design Life Rule, AIR SAFETY WK.,July 30, 1990, at 3 [hereinaf-
ter Aircraft Design Life Rule]. The text of H.R. 3774, as approved by the House,
reads as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Aging Aircraft Safety Act of 1990"
SECTION 2. AGING AIRCRAFT RULEMAKING PROCEEDING
(a) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall initiate a rulemak-
ing proceeding for the purpose of issuing a rule to assure the con-
tinuing airworthiness of aging aircraft.
(b) INSPECTIONS AND RECORD REVIEWS.-
(1) GENERAL REQUIREMENT.-The rule issued pursuant
to this section shall, at a minimum, require the Administrator
to make such inspections, and conduct such reviews of main-
tenance and other records, of each aircraft used by an air car-
rier to provide air transportation as may be necessary to
enable the Administrator to determine that such aircraft is in
safe condition and is properly maintained for operation in air
transportation.
(2) PART OF HEAVY MAINTENANCE CHECKS.-The in-
spections and reviews required under paragraph (1) shall be
carried out as part of each heavy maintenance check of the
aircraft conducted on or after the first day of the 15th year in
which the aircraft is in service.
(3) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL AVIATION ACT.-The
inspections required under paragraph (1) shall be conducted
as provided in section 601(a)(3)(C) of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958.
(c) DEMONSTRATION OF STRUCTURAL AND PARTS MAIN-
TENANCE.-The rule issued pursuant to this section shall, at a
minimum, require the air carrier to demonstrate to the Adminis-
trator, as part of the inspection required by the rule, that mainte-
nance of the aircraft's structure, skin, and other age-sensitive parts
and components has been adequate and timely enough to ensure
the highest degree of safety.
(d) PROCEDURES.-The rule issued pursuant to this section shall
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merce, Science and Transportation Committee on July 17,
1990.2 8 There has been no significant action in the Sen-
ate as of the date of this writing.20 9
B. FAA and Industry Response
Anthony Broderick, Associate Administrator for Regu-
lation and Certification at the FAA, stated that H.R. 3774
presents both philosophical and practical problems for
the agency.210 One practical problem with the program
set out by H.R. 3774 is the shortage of FAA inspectors.21 '
establish procedures to be followed in carrying out the inspections
required by the rule.
(e) AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT.-The rule issued pursuant to
this section shall require the air carrier to make available to the
Administrator the aircraft and such inspection, maintenance, and
other records pertaining to the aircraft as the Administrator may
require for carrying out reviews required by the rule.
SECTION 3. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SAFETY PROGRAMS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Administrator shall establish-
(1) a program to verify that air carriers are maintaining their air-
craft in accordance with maintenance programs approved by the
Federal Aviation Administration;
(2) a program-
(A) to provide inspectors and engineers of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration with training necessary for conducting au-
diting inspections of aircraft operated by air carriers for
corrosion and metal fatigue; and
(B) to enhance participation of such inspectors and engineers
in such inspections; and
(3) a program to ensure that air carriers demonstrate to the Ad-
ministrator their commitment and technical competence to assure
the airworthiness of aircraft operated by such carriers.
SECTION 4. ADMINISTRATOR DEFINED.
As used in this Act, the term "Administrator" means the Adminis-
trator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
H.R. 3774, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
208 136 CONG REC. S9855 (daily ed. July 17, 1990).
2- Senator Ford, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation, is not
prepared to call for the mandatory retirement of aircraft, although he commented
the "safe life" concept reflected in the House Resolution "seems to make sense."
Aging Aircraft Hearing Raises Questions for Congress, Av. DAILY, Apr. 12, 1989. Other
senators fear that a mandatory retirement age is "a simplistic response to a com-
plicated problem." Id.
2- FAA, Airlines Differ on Aging Aircraft Inspections, Av. DAILY, May 2, 1990, at 217.
211 See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text for a discussion of the FAA
worker shortage.
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The bill would require the FAA to furnish inspectors and
engineers with training to qualify them to conduct inspec-
tions for fatigue and corrosion.1 2 Broderick estimated
that it would take at least five years to hire and train those
inspectors and called the goal of 1000 inspections in the
first year of enactment "unrealistic. ' 21 3 Broderick also ar-
gues that the FAA does not want to incur the potential
liability inherent in the requirement that the FAA make
the final determination of airworthiness based on a review
of maintenance records. 4
In addition to the FAA's objections to the bill, several
industry representatives fear that the bill could have the
opposite of its intended effect. 2 5 Those individuals ex-
pressed concern that emphasizing an age limit or age re-
lated compulsory modification might lead to complacency
in routine inspections. 216 Furthermore, manufacturers do
not set mandatory retirement dates for aircraft. 7 Thus,
in spite of the House Bill, both the FAA and the industry
firmly oppose the proposed mandatory retirement as a so-
lution to the aging aircraft problem.
VI. Is MANDATORY RETIREMENT A GOOD IDEA?
The FAA and Congress clearly advocate similar ap-
proaches to the aging aircraft problem, but with one im-
portant difference. The FAA approach assumes that
through the conscientious application of a preventative
maintenance program coupled with periodic replacement
of parts, an aircraft can be safely flown almost indefi-
nitely.2 8 The government approach, on the other hand,
2 2 See Aircraft Design Life Rule, supra note 207, at 3.
21- FAA, Airlines Differ on Aging Aircraft Inspections, supra note 210, at 217. Broder-
ick later revised that time table to three years. Id.
214 Id.
215 Bill to Subject Older Air Transports to Recertification is Questioned, AIR SAFETY WK.,
Dec. 18, 1989, at 3.
21" Id. Clearly, age becomes a more serious problem when inspections fail to
identify its side effects - corrosion and fatigue. Cary & Duffy, supra note 37, at
16.
21 Cary & Duffy, supra note 37, at 16.
218 Ott & O'Lone, supra note 12, at 94. According to Boeing, the actual lifetime
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takes the position that there will eventually come a time
when no amount of prevention can assure the structural
integrity and reliability of a plane; at that point the plane
must be retired.
At present, the precise point at which retirement be-
comes necessary is difficult to determine, as the problem
is relatively new. Aircraft "used to become technologi-
cally obsolete" before their age raised safety issues. To-
day, planes continue to fly safely beyond their design
goals.2 ' 9 Thus, any "age" chosen for mandatory retire-
ment will be arbitrary. Eventually, experience will be the
best indicator for assessing the longevity of an airplane, as
we will learn what to look for as planes age.
22 0
A. Factors to Consider
1. On the Government Level
Clearly, many factors affect the decision to mandate re-
tirement of aging aircraft. Which factors are most rele-
vant necessarily vary depending on who is making the
decision, as government objectives are not precisely the
same as airline objectives. From the perspective of Con-
gress and the FAA, it is most important to assure that the
aging airline fleet remains safe; industry will invariably fo-
cus more attention on the cost factor. Overall cost to the
industry is a factor that the government will consider, but
it is secondary to safety considerations.
In most respects, the aging aircraft proposal offered by
the House of Representatives is similar to the revised pol-
icy of the FAA. In fact, the retirement issue is the only
real point on which Congress and the FAA disagree.
Under the FAA plan, an airline would make the ultimate
retirement decision based on economics, for, with supple-
mental maintenance, the planes should remain safe virtu-
will be determined by economics; "there comes a time when an aging airframe
becomes too expensive to maintain." Id.
2 William F. Allman, The Fatigue Factor: Testing an Airplane's Mettle, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 16, 1988, at 18.
221 Id.
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ally forever. The government prefers tests which will ask
the question, "Is this old airplane safe?"' 221 By requiring
an affirmative answer to this question before aircraft re-
turn to service, the legislature wants to assure the public
that planes in the American fleet are safe. 22 This ap-
proach takes what is perhaps the more reasonable posi-
tion that no plane can last forever, no matter how well
maintained.
2. Does Mandatory Retirement Constitute a Taking?
The House approach, which may result in mandatory
retirement of aircraft as they age, involves a potential con-
stitutional complication in the event such planes are
forced to retire. If it does require an airline to retire an
aircraft, the government may be subject to an action for
inverse condemnation. Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, the government cannot take pri-
vate property without just compensation.223 It is clear
that a regulation can effect a taking if it denies an owner
economically viable use of his property. 224
No cases have dealt specifically with the takings issue in
the context of legislatively mandated retirement of air-
craft, which have a public use; however, in a case dealing
with regulation of public transportation, the Supreme
Court held that although use of railroad property is sub-
ject to public regulation, "arbitrary and unreasonable"
regulation that infringes on the right of ownership can
constitute a taking. 22 5 The question becomes, then,
whether mandatory retirement of aging aircraft is an arbi-
trary or unreasonable regulation. Such a regulation
would clearly be unreasonable if the government set an
arbitrary date or age at which all aircraft must be retired.
Under the House Resolution, however, no plane would be
2'' House Report, supra note 19, at 6.
222 Id.
221 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
224 Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
22.1 Chicago, R.I. & Pa. Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 97 (1931).
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forced to retire until it has been deemed unsafe and, pre-
sumably, beyond repair. Arguably, such a scheme is not
unreasonable, for it sets a definite standard and looks to
the safety of air passengers.
Since property used for public transportation is subject
to the Takings Clause, an analogy can be drawn to cases
in which municipalities have required property owners to
demolish buildings which were determined to be unsafe.
In Miles v. District of Columbia,220 for example, the plaintiff
owned two buildings which the city condemned. After six
years, during which the plaintiff attempted to restore the
buildings, the buildings were destroyed.22 7  Plaintiff
brought suit alleging a taking of property without just
compensation, and the court granted her petition. The is-
sue of valuation of her interest in the condemned build-
ings was remanded. 28
In Benenson v. United States,229 the Court of Claims
reached a similar result, holding that government regula-
tions which completely deprived property owners of any
right to use their property constituted a taking of their fee
interest and required compensation. 3 ° Miles and Benenson
stand for the principle that property owners are entitled
to just compensation if government regulations, federal
or local, deprive them of the enjoyment of their property
for the public good. 23  Forcing airlines to retire planes in
the interest of safety is clearly such a regulation.
If the court finds mandatory retirement of aged aircraft
constitutes a taking, the issue of what compensation is due
2.f, 510 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
227 Id. at 191.
,2 Id. at 195.
229 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
230 Id. at 952.
2.11 In order for just compensation to attach, the taking must be a legitimate
exercise of governmental power for the public good. See Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1987). "The nature of the
State's interest in the regulation is a critical factor in determining whether a taking
has occurred." Id. at 488. The government might argue in airline cases that it is
preventing a nuisance by requiring retirement of unsafe planes, although that ar-
gument would probably not succeed.
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arises. Valuation of a party's interest in property that has
been deemed unsafe presents a difficult issue. Both cases
previously discussed remanded the valuation question. 2
Just compensation is generally not equal to the replace-
ment cost of the property taken, but rather fair market
value at the time of the taking.2 33 In the case of an aircraft
that has been declared unsafe, fair market value of the
plane would be virtually nothing, and the owner would
recover nothing for his lost property interest. In cases
such as this, where manifest injustice would result from
the fair market approach, a court may look at the facts and
consider replacement value in its determination of just
compensation.234 The potential cost to the government
of paying just compensation to airlines if mandatory re-
tirement is characterized as a taking is a factor that Con-
gress must weigh carefully before forcing planes to retire.
3. Airline Perspective
The airline industry has manifested a desire to play a
role in deciding the aging aircraft issue. This desire is evi-
dent from the overwhelming support of and participation
in the various task forces formed shortly after the Aloha
incident.2 35 Absent a federal mandate, while airlines must
operate within the FAA's regulatory framework, each air-
line must make its own decision on the retirement issue,
but the factors they consider will differ significantly from
those discussed above, which apply to decisions made
from an out-of-the-market perspective. Airlines must
consider the economic effects of these decisions on their
business as well as the common good of the industry.
Generally, factors the airlines consider include mainte-
nance costs, the status of the used aircraft market, the
route system and which planes are best suited to a given
route, what new models are available, and the availability
232 See Benenson, 548 F.2d at 952; Miles, 510 F.2d at 195.
23. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
2.4 Unites States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
2-- Parrish, supra note 18, at 74.
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of financing.2 36 While the aggressive FAA inspection and
maintenance plan could increase the safe life of an aircraft
by replacing, over time, its entire original structure, the
question remains whether it would be economical to go
that far. 3
Recent high fuel prices and noise control regulations
may be factors that have an important impact on the air-
line industry's decision regarding retirement of older air-
craft. At present, the industry appears to be on the edge
of a sharp decline.238 Edmund S. Greenslat, president of
ESB Aviation Services, has forecast the retirement of be-
tween 100 and 160 aircraft by 1993, with a sharp rise in
retirement rates beginning in 1994, resulting in the exo-
dus of approximately 1000 planes from the world fleet by
1996.239 Such predictions, however, may be premature
and unwise.
Noise control regulations may have a substantial effect
on the aging aircraft issue. Older aircraft are louder than
the newer models. 240 The timing of new anti-noise re-
quirements, which Congress has asked the FAA to con-
sider, will strongly influence the pace of retirements.24'
In fact, noise control legislation may be an alternative to
mandatory retirement.242  According to Greenslat,
"[O]nce the Stage 3 requirements are known, the older
2-6 Toni Taylor, Retirement for Planes?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, at 20.
237 Lefer, supra note 103, at 59. Some argue that the industry should not worry
about the expense. Err on the Side of Safety, supra note 5, at 9. While FAA-man-
dated modifications will cost approximately $600,000 per plane, this amount is
not unreasonable, especially since it can be spread across several years. Id. U.S.
airlines currently spend between $1.5 and $2 million per plane on maintenance
each year. Id.
238 U.S. Airlines Face Big Losses Due to Rise in Fuel, Other Costs, Av. WK. & Sp. TECH.,
Sept. 3, 1990, at 203 [hereinafter Big Losses]. "Traffic is already looking sick and
the chance of stretching out aircraft orders, dropping options and parking old
airplanes is very real." Id.
239 Id. This is a conservative estimate; Boeing calculates retirements of more
than 300 per year in the beginning of the decade. Id.
240 David Evans, Noise Issue is Quiet Ploy to Replace Aging Planes, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
11, 1989, at CI.
24, Big Losses, supra note 238, at 203; see also Evans, supra note 240, at CI.
242 Evans, supra note 240, at C I.
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airplanes will have the sign of death on them. '2 43 On the
other hand, requiring all aircraft to meet these new regu-
lations may simply result in new mufflers, or "hush kits,"
on old planes.244 Such a result might have the ironic ef-
fect of keeping older planes in service longer.245 The air-
line industry hopes to avoid unnecessary complications by
keeping the aging aircraft problem separate from the
noise issue.246 If the fleet improvement requirements and
the noise issue are linked, however, the airlines might
benefit from "one-stop shopping; the fuselage work can
get done at the same time planes are pulled out of service
for hush kit installation," resulting in a minimum of
"down time. ' '1 4 7 In either case, noise control procedures
are an additional expense which airlines will certainly
consider.248
Other questions regarding retired planes, whether re-
tired by force or voluntarily, must be answered. One of
the most pressing issues concerns the status of retired
planes. Will they be scrapped, sold to companies for use
as freighter planes,249 or sold to foreign countries? It is
clear that not all aircraft which are no longer used by com-
mercial airlines will be retired permanently, then sold for
scrap metal or parts.2 ° Since passenger jets can be con-
verted to freighters with little difficulty, a high demand for
older planes exists outside the commercial aviation indus-
243 Big Losses, supra note 238, at 203. "You have to wonder what [the hush kit]
does for you, because you still have old technology .... [Y]ou have to wonder
whether you aren't better off to buy a new airplane." Henderson, Impact on Stage
III Retrofits?, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Feb. 1989, at 61.
244 Evans, supra note 10, at C6.
245 Evans, supra note 240, at C10.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 USAir Launches DC-9 Aging Aircraft Inspection Program, Av. DAILY, Dec. 15,
1989, at 495-96. The potential costs are "enormous." The current Stage 2 fleet
has a market value of approximately $30 billion, while it would cost at least $50
billion to replace it with newer planes. Evans, supra note 240, at 10.
219 New Regulations, Surplus Will Force Narrow-Body Transports Out of Service, Av. WK
& SP. TECH, July 2, 1990, at 73, 74 [hereinafter New Regulations]. Passenger jets
can be converted to freighters, for which there is a high demand. Id.
2- Id. at 73.
1991] 463
464 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
try.25I For example, Federal Express currently buys many
older 727s from United Airlines. 25 2 "Retired" planes not
purchased for freight use may also be sold or leased to
other carriers or even to other countries.253 Finally, if the
planes are to be sold, where will the line between the
secondhand value of the planes and the cost of modifica-
tion and repair be drawn?
Even in light of these factors, it is unlikely that airlines
will retire their planes willingly after investing enough
money in them to meet FAA standards of maintenance
and repair. 54 In fact, carriers in the midst of complying
with the new directives say that the "stringent and stan-
dardized" inspection and repair procedures mandated by
the FAA are a much better approach to the problem of
aging aircraft, despite their cost, than mandatory retire-
ment.255 Major airlines stress the need for uniformity of
application, however, to ensure that consistent mainte-
nance requirements are established and met by all
carriers.256
B. Overall Effect of Mandatory Retirement
Mandatory retirement of older aircraft would disrupt
the United States' air transport system.257 This disruption
could trigger a chain of failures among smaller airlines
"staffed" primarily with old planes.258 On the other hand,
in the current market, most of these smaller airlines are
21 Id. at 74. "There will be a number of operators that will always pick up an
airplane if it's a good buy and it fits their needs, like Federal Express." Id. at 73.
252 Christopher Power, One More Reason for Fear of Flying, Bus. WKLY., Jan. 16,
1989, at 31.
253 Taylor, supra note 236, at 20.
2-.4 USAir Launches DC-9 Aging Aircraft Inspection Program, supra note 248, at 496.
25-1 Donna K. Henderson, Airlines, FAA Intensify Old Transport Efforts, AIR TRANS-
PORT WORLD, Feb. 1989, at 61. "We don't want to be caught up in a retirement
regime or mandated maintenance program that has no logic." Id.
256 Id. Currently, there is a big disparity among airlines as to how conscien-
tiously repairs are actually carried out. Id.
257 Err on the Side of Safety, supra note 5, at 9. Mandatory retirement would "in-
crease ticket costs and possibly force some airlines out of business." Id.
2 5 New Regulations, supra note 249, at 73.
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not faring very well. 259 As long as airlines are able to
meet consumer demand only by operating planes beyond
their design lives, they will resist retiring planes. Both the
long waiting period and the cost of new planes encourage
extended use of older aircraft. Mandatory retirement at
an arbitrarily set "age" will not achieve significant safety
goals; in fact, it might have the effect of grounding planes
that are safe at a time when demand for those planes is
high. Higher fares to offset the cost of new planes would
probably result. 260 Furthermore, if heightened safety is
not the result of retirement, the airline industry will suffer
unnecessarily.
VII. CONCLUSION
This comment has addressed the most significant issues
that impact the final decision regarding aging aircraft.
Whether mandatory retirement is the best solution to the
problem of aging aircraft is a multifaceted question, com-
plicated by the fact that the major parties it affects disa-
gree as to the proper course of action. The industry and
the FAA oppose retirement plans, while Congress main-
tains that such plans are a potentially viable response to
the problem that the aging fleet presents. Clearly, there is
a general agreement that no arbitrary age for retirement
should be set; the FAA leaves the ultimate decision to the
industry, while the House Resolution provides for testing
of individual aircraft at a predetermined critical date.
Under both programs, as long as a plane is deemed safe,
it would be allowed to continue to fly.
Safety must be of primary concern, but economics nec-
essarily enters the equation as well. High passenger de-
mand and the cost of new planes, coupled with a five-year
manufacturing backlog, means that mandatory retirement
will almost certainly result in higher fares and greater in-
convenience for passengers. Such sacrifices would, of
2.-, Evans, supra note 10, at C6; Big Losses, supra note 238, at 203.
2-i Taylor, supra note 236, at 19.
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course, be justified if the overall safety of the fleet would
be compromised by allowing older planes to fly. Under
the new FAA regime, however, such a result is unlikely.
The FAA regulations, if fully and effectively imple-
mented, would allow the airlines to consider both safety
and economic factors. The economics of the current mar-
ket encourages the operation of planes as long as mainte-
nance costs do not exceed revenue generated by the
plane. While the government correctly argues that eco-
nomics alone should not dictate decisions where the
safety of air passengers is at stake, the FAA program con-
tains safeguards which will prevent the operation of un-
safe aircraft. With its system of periodic maintenance and
replacement of parts, the program is designed to ensure
that a plane is "repaired" well before an inspection would
reveal any structural weaknesses. The safety factor, how-
ever, is inextricably linked to the regulatory standards of
the FAA, and no regulations, no matter how thorough,
will succeed in solving the problem until the difficulties at
the FAA are resolved.26'
The House Resolution emphasizes the safety element
to an even greater extent than the FAA program; it en-
compasses the FAA regulations and adds testing of planes
as they reach their design life goals to ensure that the sup-
plemental inspections and repairs are achieving their de-
sired effect - maximum safety. Coupled with new FAA
procedures, this may be the best solution. Unfortunately,
the House Resolution, if passed, would aggravate the
FAA's current problems. It would require even more in-
spectors and impose a tremendous financial burden on
the agency which it is not capable of meeting. Further-
more, the degree of mandatory testing when an aircraft
reaches the end of its design life would keep planes out of
21, Evans, supra note 10, at C6. "Until the regulatory holes are plugged, the
great number of Americans who fly every day are unwitting guinea pigs in an
uncontrolled experiment to see how much longer old airliners can be kept flying
without breaking apart." Id.
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service for extended periods of time, intensifying the in-
dustry's inability to meet consumer demand.
And finally, the House bill does not address continuing
inspection needs of aircraft which are certified to fly be-
yond their design life. Presumably, the FAA: approach
would apply in these instances, allowing the airlines to
make economic decisions. The House Bill calls for retire-
ment as a last resort when a plane is not safe enough to fly
and deemed too expensive to repair. It seems clear that
mandatory retirement is not the solution to the problem
of aging aircraft. Forcing airlines to retire old planes
would probably result in smaller airlines going out of
business and larger airlines raising fares to cover in-
creased costs. Instead of focusing on retirement, Con-
gress and the FAA need to concentrate on solving the
agency's problems. Increased financing of FAA projects
is a good place to start. Once the FAA is able to achieve
its objectives efficiently and effectively, the "repair and re-
place" strategy is the best way to keep our planes flying
safely.
1991] 467

